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 INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION  
 Michael Skerker 
 19.1  Introduction 
 This chapter will develop standards for assessing individual moral responsibility for collective 
action. In some cases, these standards expand a person’s responsibility beyond what she or he 
would be responsible for if performing the same physical behavior outside of a group setting. 
I  will argue that structural diff erences between two ideal types of groups— organizations 
and goal- oriented collectives— largely determine the baseline moral responsibility of group 
members for the group’s collective action. (Group members can be more or less responsible for 
collective action beyond that baseline due to personal qualities like knowledge of the intended 
collective outcome.) The same individual physical behavior can make the member of a goal- 
oriented collective responsible for the entire collective action to an equal degree with her fellow 
group members, whereas the typical organization member is only responsible for his contribu-
tory action. 
 I will proceed with a culpability standard of responsibility in mind when I discuss indi-
vidual responsibility. Many agree that culpability is the most morally satisfying standard of 
individual responsibility because actors are fully able to control the behavior for which they 
are deemed responsible. It follows that people can be instructed how they ought to behave; 
they can intentionally aim at that behavior; and they take conscious steps to reform if they 
miss the mark. 
 After the problem of assessing individual responsibility for collective action is exemplifi ed 
with a thought experiment in section 19.2 and some key defi nitions are provided in section 
19.3, the heart of the argument about individual responsibility in goal- oriented collectives and 
organizations will be presented in sections 19.4 and 19.5, respectively. 
 19.2  Problem Statement 
 Assigning individual responsibility for collective action can be a challenging proposition. I am going 
to use a thought experiment involving collective violent action, juxtaposing the actions of a ser-
vice member and a militia member, to discuss the ideas of this chapter, but these ideas could be 
expressed by juxtaposing formal and informal groups in any arena, e.g. hospital employees vs. Good 
Samaritans rendering aid, fi re- fi ghters vs. neighbors cooperating to put out a house fi re, etc.
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 Country A is fi ghting an unjust, aggressive war against country B while also conducting 
peace- keeping operations in nearby country C, which has been wracked by tribal 
violence. 
 Archer is a mechanic in country C who fi xes vehicles for one of the tribal militias. He 
eagerly volunteered to participate in its genocidal campaigns against rival tribes and was 
assigned to fi x the militia’s vehicles. 
 Baker is a helicopter mechanic serving aboard country A’s aircraft carrier, which is off  
the coast equidistant from B and C. He (with others) is responsible for daily maintenance 
on four of the squadron’s attack helicopters, # 601– 604. He is never informed about the 
missions of the various helicopter crews and performs daily maintenance on the copters 
regardless of their missions. A  given copter may perform very diff erent missions day 
to day. 
 On a given day, copter 601 attacks enemy troops in country B; 602 bombs a hos-
pital in country B; 603 supports troops protecting villagers from a militia in country 
C; and 604 is grounded, in need of spare parts. 
 It is at fi rst diffi  cult to assess Archer and Baker’s responsibility for the collective actions they 
help to causally advance. It is not plausible to think that any level of causal contribution makes a 
contributor fully morally responsible for any ensuing unjust collective action. Through minute 
causal connections, nearly everyone in the world would be responsible for nearly every col-
lective unjust act. It is similarly implausible to exonerate all except the direct perpetrators of 
unjust collective action, since all the violent actors in the above case depend on support per-
sonnel in order to be eff ective. Further, a slightly diff erent argument exonerating all who act in 
complex collectives to perpetrate unjust acts would implausibly imply that all one needs to do 
to avoid blame for an unjust act is to bring an accomplice. Clearly, it is absurd to assert that an 
assault victim could blame her single assailant but could not blame anyone if beaten by a group 
of three people (Cooper 1987: 140; Erskine 2003: 21). 
 Having set aside the two most extreme arguments let us consider the two mechanics’ 
contributions. Archer made possible some of the genocidaires’ transportation. Is he then morally 
responsible for everything they did after they left his garage? He knew they planned to murder 
villagers, but Archer did not kill anyone; all he did was fi x trucks. There were other mechanics 
working for the militia too, and the militia could have gotten to its destination eventually with 
diff erent vehicles. If Archer is responsible or partly responsible for genocide, is he also respon-
sible for things he (and maybe the other militia members) did not know they planned to do? If 
one of the genocidaires in Archer’s truck also decides to desecrate a religious shrine while he 
is in the village, is Archer responsible for that “deviation” from the mission as well? Where does 
Archer’s responsibility terminate? Is Archer responsible for child abuse if a genocidaire returns 
to his home village on Archer’s truck after the massacre and beats his son? 
 Baker seems even farther removed from wrongdoing. Like Archer, all he did was fi x some 
engines. Yet unlike Archer, he did not know any of the missions the helicopters were executing; 
as such he could not have intended his causal contribution to be in furtherance of a particular 
mission. Further, he did not have Archer’s evil motive of contributing toward an unjust col-
lective action. He was acting under orders, in an organization dependent on obedience for 
effi  cient functioning, which he plausibly believes is a good and vital institution. Yet helicopters 
cannot fl y unless they are maintained by aviation mechanics. So is Baker responsible for a) his 
repairs alone, b) the lawful, but possible immoral, killing of enemy troops, c) the unlawful and 
immoral bombing of a hospital, d) the unjust war as a whole, d) saving villagers from a militia; 
or e) combinations of the above? Generally speaking, are members of groups responsible for 
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their immediate individual actions, the proximate joint actions they advance with the help of 
their immediate sub- group, the ultimate large- scale action resulting from the coordinated action 
of the entire group, or all or two of the above? Further, how does the level of their personal 
knowledge or intentionality regarding the proximate and ultimate actions aff ect their respon-
sibility for them? 
 19.3  Two Types of Groups 
 Distinguishing between two kinds of groups, organizations and goal- oriented collectives will 
help assess Archer and Baker’s moral responsibility for the collective actions they help to caus-
ally advance. As we will see, diff erences in these two ideal- type groups’ internal structures 
will permit a theorist to ascribe the injustice of the collective action the group perpetrates in 
diff erent ways to the group members. 
 Organizations are long- standing, formally- constituted groups with stable roles and rotating 
personnel, like companies, the military, religious orders, and government departments. The 
structure of organizations will typically determine what their members know, and therefore 
can intend, with respect to the collective actions the organization performs.  Atypical organiza-
tion members will know or intend things about the collective actions, in a sense, in spite of the 
organization’s structure. 
 A key aspect of organizations important for us to address in order to understand the role 
played by organization members’ individual intentions and motives is what some theorists call a 
corporate intention (French  1987 ; Isaacs  2011 ; Pettit  2003 ). Corporate intentions are not simply 
an aggregate of the group’s members’ intentions, for two reasons. First, individuals cannot intend 
complex collective actions. If an intention is a kind of mental event that directs a specifi c, delib-
erate action, then an individual person cannot, strictly speaking, intend to win a baseball game; 
build a cruise ship; or win a war. These ends can only be accomplished through the collective 
action of groups (as we will see, a person can intend to do something to  contribute to a collective 
end and can be motivated to see the fulfi llment of the collective end). 
 Second, something functionally similar to an individual’s intention is created through the 
organization’s unique protocols, irreducible to any one organization member’s intention. These 
protocols are what Seumas Miller calls “joint mechanisms” or Peter French calls “corporate 
internal decision structures” (Miller  2001 :  174; French  1987 :  143; Pettit  2003 :  182; Isaacs 
 2011 :  68) sets of interlocking behaviors such as a decision- making procedures or protocols 
for transmitting orders used to coordinate actions and bring about certain types of outcomes 
within organizations. Joint mechanisms allow for variations based on the participants’ varying 
desires and inputs. For example, company bylaws might indicate that certain decisions are to 
be made by a board of directors through a vote, but each board member is free to vote as she 
wishes (Miller  2006 : 174– 6). It follows that the mechanism’s output (a subordinates’ carrying 
out orders, the outcome of a vote, etc.) can be contrary to some of the participants’ preferences. 
Importantly, the resultant corporate intention may not refl ect the personal intention of any of 
the participants (Isaacs  2011 : 30). 
 Corporate intentions are functionally identical with human intentions in the sense that they 
have the same relation to corporate actions as individual intentions do to individual actions 
(Isaacs  2011 : 30, 37; Pettit  2003 : 179, 182– 3). They lead the collective to act. A business’s cor-
porate intention, set by a planning team, such as “Model 4032 of item X will be produced in 
time for the third quarter” directs employees to engage in specifi c actions which will interact 
in such a way that the business produces model 4032 in the third quarter (described further 
below). The term “policy” might be profi tably substituted for “corporate intention” but I will 
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defer to received usage. To be clear, organizations are not super- persons with corporate urges, 
corporate emotions, and the like. Whatever we wish to call them: these intentions, “intentions,” 
or policies are corporate in the sense that they are irreducible to the human intentions of any 
one group member. 
 Apart from organizations, much group action takes place in another kind of group relevant to 
our concern with group responsibility since it is a group voluntarily formed in order to accom-
plish some goal. A “goal- oriented collective” is an ad hoc group assembled by its members 
for the accomplishment of a particular shared goal— like a group of campers, picnickers, or 
bank robbers (Isaacs  2011 : 24). Unlike organizations, characteristic members in goal- oriented 
collectives know the collective end the group exists to bring about and intend to make causal 
contributions in order to bring about that end because they are motivated to see its fruition. 
Whereas typical organization members have their knowledge of, and intentions toward, the 
organization’s collective actions framed by the structure of the group, the infl uence between 
members’ subjective states and the group structure fl ows in the other way in goal- oriented 
collectives. Such groups get their characteristic features from their founding members’ (and 
similarly disposed entrants’) horizontally coordinated, meshing intentions to perform actions 
contributing toward the commonly identifi ed collective end (Bratman  1999 ) and their identical 
motives to bring about the collective end that constitutes the group’s raison d’etre. There may 
be ambiguous cases where ad hoc groups become more formalized over time and take on more 
of the qualities of organizations. I will refer to goal- oriented collectives in what follows as an 
ideal type. I do not claim that these are the only two types of groups but these two clearly cover 
much of the collective contexts for action. 
 19.4  Responsibility for Ultimate Collective Actions in  
Goal- Oriented Collectives 
 Having discussed the diff erence between organizations and goal- oriented collectives, the next 
task is to ask if members of these groups can be individually responsible for their collective 
action and if the diff erent structures of the group make a diff erence for member responsibility. 
For example, is Archer responsible for genocide, for the murders perpetrated by the genocidaires 
ferried on the particular trucks he fi xed, or merely for fi xing some truck engines? Is Baker 
responsible for fi xing engines (his individual action), for airstrikes (a proximate collective 
action), or for the war (the ultimate collective action)? 
 We need to consider if the collective actions of organizations and goal- oriented collectives 
can be scaled down in such a way that the full moral weight of the collective action is present in 
the contributory action. I will discuss goal- oriented collectives fi rst. The assassination of Julius 
Caesar is a familiar and easily imagined example of a goal- oriented collective action. I will use 
it as a reference for what follows. The collective action of a group of senators stabbing Caesar 
can be scaled down for the purpose of moral consideration to a single contributing action of 
one senator stabbing Caesar. We have no problem assessing each member’s culpability for the 
collective action when we can scale down a collective action like this one that is the aggre-
gate of largely identical actions. A culpability standard for individual action looks at the actor’s 
power, knowledge, intention, and motive. Specifi cally, a culpability standard considers the actor’s 
power to plan, commit, and complete an action; his knowledge (or awareness) of his action and 
its likely outcome; his personal intention to commit the action; and his motive to bring about 
the associated end. Such a standard fi nds suffi  cient material to analyze in the person of each 
senator to deem him culpable for the assassination. We come to the same conclusion of culp-
ability for assassination whether we analyze a senator acting in concert with others or a senator 
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assassinating Caesar on his own. Each Roman senator voluntarily performs a physical action in 
concert with others’ identical performances— an individual action suffi  cient on its own to kill 
Caesar— fully aware that stabbing can lead to death; intending to stab him; and hoping he dies 
as a result. 
 It is important to note for what follows, that it is not the case that each senator would be 
culpable for assassination only in the event that each senator’s contributory action was a lethal 
blow. Due to the nature of the collective action, each conspiring senator is culpable for murder 
even if his contributory was a non- lethal action, either for it being a non- lethal stabbing or it 
not being an act of violence at all. Had one of the conspirators acted alone in these cases, he 
would be culpable for assault, attempted assassination, or no crime at all. Yet operating as part 
of a cabal, he is culpable for assassination even if his sword thrust only grazed the dictator or 
if he only smuggled the swords into the Senate since he knowingly and intentionally joined a 
group that intended to kill Caesar and which did kill Caesar. While the case is intuitively clearer 
when the constituent physical behaviors are identical, culpability is equally shared even when 
members contribute diverse physical behaviors to the collective end. 1 When a person who 
wishes to achieve an outcome that is only possible through group cooperation knowingly joins 
a group expressly dedicated to the singular achievement of that end, he is using that group as 
a kind of instrument to achieve an end he values. Other group members act with him and in 
his name even when he is not directly contributing to a joint project since they would not be 
acting but for the existence of the group and the contributions of all its members. He should 
thereby be held responsible for everything the group does that is in line with the features that 
commended themselves to his membership— even if he did not know about the specifi c joint 
action in question (Kutz  2000 : 122, 144, 155, 157; Bazargan  2013 : 124; Narveson  2002 : 191– 2; 
Feinberg  1991 : 62; Mellema  2006 : 171; Runciman  2003 : 47; Sadler  2006 : 139; Fain  1972 : 80). 
 Let us return to our thought experiment involving the mechanics. Archer wants to des-
troy the hated ethnic group; joins a militia he knows is bent on that end; and intends to fi x 
engines as a contributory action furthering genocide. He does not necessarily know where 
the truck he fi xes will go tomorrow, but knows they will serve the militia’s purpose. To antici-
pate the argument to follow, Archer cannot claim to be ignorant of his group’s actions in the 
way that someone in a large organization can reasonably claim ignorance of his group’s action. 
Whereas an organization like a corporation or military may be engaged in activities broadly 
characterized as “generating profi ts” or “serving the state,” the size, complexity, and compart-
mentalization of organizations blind most participants to the specifi c collective actions the 
organization performs. The breadth of the organization’s general mission also prevents the the-
orist from assuming that participants’ motives for contributing their work product is morally 
dubious since the broad corporate mission does not have the obvious negative moral status 
like that of a more narrowly- tailored group like a genocidal militia. It thus seems important to 
follow Isaacs in limiting a charge of complicity to entrants/ recruits to goal- oriented collectives, 
excluding entrants/ recruits to organizations (cf. Kutz  2000 : 157; Bazargan  2013 : 187). 
 Is Archer more or less responsible for genocide than the other members of the militia? It may 
be descriptively helpful to categorize diff erent types of complicity within a group (e.g. recruiter, 
facilitator, encourager, etc.) (Mellema  2006 ). Yet I think it is appropriate to assign equal moral 
responsibility to all causal contributors rather than identify diff erent levels of responsibility with 
diff erent job descriptions in a goal- oriented collective. Responsibility for the collective action 
of a goal- oriented collective can be assigned in this way because all the traditional markers of 
culpability for individual immoral action are met on the part of each group member. While the 
behavioral aspect of their contributory action may be morally trivial unto itself, the participant’s 
motive to bring about the unjust collective action and participatory intention to do anything 
9781138092242_pi-512.indd   278 11-Jan-20   17:06:54
279
Individual Responsibility
279
to support the group’s characteristic activity makes the participant “the inclusive author of the 
group’s actions” (Bazargan, quoting Kutz  2013 : 186). Thus, his motive and participatory inten-
tion change how we should identify Archer’s action, from “fi xing the engine” to “participating 
in genocide.” Not only does the collective action depend on Archer’s material contribution, but 
Archer is only fi xing engines, rather than doing something more obviously problematic, because 
he volunteered to do whatever he was best suited to do in order to contribute to the end he 
shared with others. He joined the militia because he wanted to contribute to its characteristic 
work of genocide. Had there been enough mechanics, he might have been handed a machete 
and told to get after it. Archer is equally morally responsible for genocide and can be punished 
with an equal sentence alongside those who directly killed people. 
 An exception to this argument about equal responsibility would occur in a scenario where 
a goal- oriented collective lost some of the transparency that gives it the moral character 
highlighted here. Imagine a group is formed to support a political candidate: they hand out 
fl yers, make phone calls in his support, etc. A faction within that group begins to engage in 
violent actions on behalf of the candidate. A member of the group who, reasonably, really had 
no idea what some of the members were doing would not be responsible for the political vio-
lence. It is conceivable that a goal- oriented collective might take on more of the aspects of an 
organization in this way. 
 19.5  Responsibility for Ultimate Actions in Organizations 
 By contrast, the characteristic collective action of organizations, what some call “irreducibly 
corporate actions,” do not scale down to the individual contributory actions retaining the moral 
character of the macro action (Isaacs  2011 ; Erskine 2003; Runciman  2003 ; Fain  1972 ; Pettit 
 2003 ; French 1991; Copp  2006 ; Cooper  1972 ). In irreducibly corporate actions, very diff erent 
contributory actions performed by actors with varying levels of knowledge about the wider 
enterprise are combined by means of a corporate intention to form a collective action. Bearing 
in mind a comparison with the scaling down of assassination- by- group to assassination- by- 
individual, the morally interesting aspects of an organization’s actions and its component actions 
are often lost when we look at a member’s contribution to that collective action. The moral 
character of the collective action is lost amongst its component actions because of the typical 
member’s fractional causal responsibility for collective action, his blinkered epistemic position, 
and his compelled adoption (explained below) of the organization’s corporate intention and 
motive. 
 For example, we can see Baker’s control over, knowledge of, and intentions with respect 
to the helicopters’ operations are negligible. While his helping to fi x the engines is materially 
necessary for the airstrikes to happen, the repairs do not directly contribute to the airstrikes. 
He performs daily maintenance on the helicopters whether they are conducting airstrikes, 
performing patrols, rescuing shipwreck survivors, engaging in training missions, or sitting below 
deck. Baker does not know anything in particular about the airstrikes. He forms an intention to 
tighten certain bolts; lube certain valves; and perform computer diagnostics merely because he 
was ordered to do so. Absent the actions of thousands of other people, his engine maintenance 
would have absolutely nothing to do with an airstrike. 
 One might suspect Baker’s intention to fi x the engines off ers grounds for responsibility 
for the collective action, which the engine repairs make possible. Individual intentions off er 
grounds for responsibility for collective action in the case of goal- oriented collectives like the 
militia. In goal- oriented collectives, the actor forms the intention to perform a contributory 
act as a conscious contribution to a collective action he joined the collective to see occur. The 
9781138092242_pi-512.indd   279 11-Jan-20   17:06:54
280
Michael Skerker
280
group may have assigned him a specifi c task but he joined wanting to do  whatever he could to 
contribute to the collective end. As argued in the previous section, this participatory intention 
is inculpating. In the case of military action and other irreducibly corporate actions though, 
the service member’s intention to perform a contributory action is usually not a self- generated 
intention but a person- sized segment of the group’s corporate intention impressed by others for 
actions contributing to still other agents’ broader ends. 
 Why can we not claim that Baker is fi xing the engine purely of his own volition like a 
typical member of a goal- oriented collective? Military actions are defi nitionally those actions 
consequent to orders passed down through the chain of command (e.g. a Marine playing a 
video game after returning from patrol is not performing a military action). Baker makes his 
commanding offi  cer’s interpretation and application of the corporate intention of winning 
the war his own insofar as he is acting as a professional (Isaacs  2011 : 29). When people act qua 
professionals, they act according to their institutional procedures, which in the military context, 
means following the lawful orders of superior offi  cers in one’s chain of command. A civilian who 
snuck aboard the ship and started repairing the helicopter engine simply because he enjoyed 
tinkering with engines would not be acting as a professional and would not be performing a 
military action. Thus, the corporate intention of fi ghting the war does not scale down to a par-
ticipating service member’s individual intention because Baker does not and cannot intend his 
contributing action as a military professional absent the larger chain of command compelling 
him to adopt its intention. He would not have the intention to fi x the engine were he not in 
the military and would not have the intention to fi x the engine as part of a collective military 
action were he in the military but not ordered to fi x the engine. 
 This argument about transference of intentions requires further elaboration. How exactly 
does the corporate intention to win a war get translated into service members’ individual 
intentions to perform specifi c actions? Given this broad corporate end of winning a particular 
war set by the president, subsidiary corporate intentions to accomplish subsidiary collective 
actions like neutralizing the country’s air defenses are determined through joint mechanisms in 
planning cells, wherein a staff  of fl ag offi  cers and their advisers determine the war plans. These 
decisions are then imposed and communicated throughout the organization according to a par-
ticular procedure, at which point group members are institutionally obliged to act according 
to these directives, which is to say, to act as if the corporate intention was their own. Seumas 
Miller introduces some technical vocabulary regarding intentions that is helpful here (Miller 
 2001 : 64). Type a) intentions are for the actor’s own actions while type c) intentions are for 
someone other than the intending agent to do something, as when a teacher tells a student to 
complete an assignment. So the president has a type c) intention that the military defeat the 
enemy regime. In response, an admiral develops a type a) intention to give an order to move 
the carrier strike group into position; he also has a type c) intention that the rear admiral in 
charge of the relevant carrier strike group obeys his command. The rear admiral derives a type 
a) intention to give orders about particular headings and speeds of the strike group’s ships to 
his subordinates based on his boss’s type c) intention. Far down the chain of command, Petty 
Offi  cer Baker derives a type a) intention to fi x an engine consequent to his Senior Chief ’s type 
c) intention that he do so. 
 Not only are the agents’ intentions the vicarious vestige of their superiors’ intentions, rather 
than their own, the vector of transmission of these intentions and ends is “pushed” rather than 
“pulled” it is characterized by compulsion rather than voluntary choice. This vector means 
that the theorist has no grounds for assuming service members would have intentions for their 
contributory actions absent the institutional framework of the chain of command. The theorist 
cannot assume the service member natively has the intention to perform the action causally 
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linking him to the collective action. Shortly, I will address atypical situations where the service 
member really does have the relevant intention. 
 A debate between individualist and collectivist philosophers on the subject of social 
ontology is relevant to this point regarding collective responsibility. 2 Collectivists look to some 
centralized, top- down structure like a corporate intention to give form and direction to a group 
whereas individualists see only individuals as having intentions and so whatever “thing” binds 
together and animates a group must be an abstraction, an aggregate of individual intentions, 
ideas, or actions. Individualists in short, see  all groups as animated in the manner of goal- oriented 
collectives, even if some collectives have more formal structures, hierarchies, and longevity. The 
morally interesting elements of a group’s knowledge, intention, motive, and actions can always 
be reduced down, without remainder, to the contributing actions of the group’s members. 
 The individualist picture is correct in the case of goal- oriented collectives like the geno-
cidal militia in country C; the members create and drive the group. We have a suffi  cient picture 
of what is animating the collective action if we add up all the sentences describing the indi-
vidual actions of those within the groups. There is no pre- existing executive command structure 
shaping and directing the members. 3 In the case of organizational action however, the individu-
alist account does not account for the fact that the military, say, is oriented toward certain ends, 
and collective decision- making and communication structures like planning cells and chains 
of command are embedded in the organization before any recruits fi ll the barracks. Further, a 
popular political and social theory has inculcated recruits with values that lead them to privilege 
military role- based reasons over their personal intuitions. Therefore, that which drives service 
personnel to act on certain reasons is not accounted for when we add up all the sentences of 
the form “Petty Offi  cer Baker did X after he chose to see his orders as action- guiding.” 4 The 
structure producing the orders and the common reason personnel feel it is compulsory to make 
those orders action- guiding are not accounted for with this individualist account. 
 So now having clarifi ed that the full moral weight of the collective action is not neces-
sarily present in the organization member’s contributory actions, we need to determine how 
far someone like Baker’s responsibilities do extend. Diff erences between organizational and 
goal- oriented collective action set what I will call “the horizon of responsibility” at the  con-
tributory action for an irreducibly corporate action and at the  collective action for a goal- oriented 
collective action for the same physical behavior. The horizon of responsibility is the demarca-
tion of what action the actor might be culpable for. We have already discussed how Archer is 
equally morally responsible for genocide with the rest of the militia members because of his 
individual action. Yet Baker’s contributory action  on its own is insuffi  cient to deem him culp-
able for an unjustifi ed collective action if he is in an unjust war. His contributory action has 
to be referred to the collective action in order to discern if his material involvement with the 
unjust war makes him responsible for an unjustifi ed action. For the purpose of assessing culp-
ability, a service member is not committing an individual unjustifi ed action but  contributing to 
an unjust collective action . Baker is not performing an “unjust repair” (which would be possible 
if he deliberately neglected some crucial task out of animus towards the pilot), but “fi xing a 
helicopter’s engine in an unjust war.” Such an individual contributory action may be morally 
trivial on its own since the full moral gravity of an irreducibly corporate action is not present 
in its contributory actions. The contributory action instead gets its moral weight in  reference to 
the collective action, dependent on the agent’s knowledge of and intentional state with respect 
to the collective action. 
 Again, this reference to the collective action contrasts with an individual or goal- oriented 
collective action in which the individual or contributory action is unjustifi ed by itself. Archer 
and Baker are performing the same physical behavior but Archer’s is richly morally capitalized 
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from the start as “participation in genocide”— and his charge sheet in a court might state as 
much. Baker is only performing a discrete action of engine repair. The theorist is precluded 
from making a summary judgment about the culpability of an organizational actor like Baker 
but instead needs to consider his power, knowledge, and intentionality with respect to the 
unjust irreducibly corporate action in order to assign culpability for a contributory action. One 
must ask questions like the following. Does Baker have the freedom to avoid contributing to the 
unjust war? What does he know about the collective action? Does he intend his contribution 
to advance the collective action because he wants to see its fruition? How does he interpret the 
corporate intention of his organization? 
 With respect to that fi nal question, an organization member’s actions are typically more 
“the organization’s” instead of their own, but organization members still have to interpret their 
orders and exercise discretion in the execution of their role obligations. Therefore, when we 
look to the individual responsibility of organization members for their contributory actions, 
we may have occasion to magnify the moral importance of their individual actions beyond the 
immediate impact of their physical behaviors. We need to take into account both the member’s 
individual attributes and her role responsibilities in order to discern how she occupied the role 
and executed the task diff erently than other people in her position. In other words, we should 
not judge a general in the same way we would a civilian urging a group of people on to vio-
lence, but compare her to other generals in similar situations in order to see how she personally 
interpreted the corporate intention of the army and what creativity and wisdom she brought to 
her role. Typically, the individual actions of low- ranking organization members will not be mor-
ally rich because they are relatively banal unto themselves and because there is little room for 
the introduction of personal creativity. Higher ranking members’ personal actions may be mor-
ally weightier because there is more room for the individual’s personal moral qualities to play a 
role interpreting the corporate intention. Giving orders is especially signifi cant as order- givers 
often have a lot of discretion to convert broad corporate intentions into specifi c action- guiding 
directives that in turn create the conditions for subordinates to engage in morally upright or 
morally defective actions (Skerker  2014 : 220). Immoral or negligent orders make the order- 
giver responsible for what subordinates do pursuant to those orders. 
 Finally, an organization member  can be individually responsible for the specifi c joint projects 
to which she contributes and/ or the broader collective actions of her organization if she atyp-
ically knows about the specifi c unjust actions and contributes to them while motivated to see 
their fruition. All the requirements of culpability are here met, with participatory intention to 
be part of a group contributing to a specifi c collective outcome doing the inculpating work 
done by individual intention in fraught individual actions. So, for example, Baker can be equally 
jointly responsible with other knowing members of the crew of helicopter #602 for bombing 
a hospital if he knows about the eff ects of his contributory actions and is motivated to bring 
about the specifi c unjustifi ed action. He is also equally jointly responsible with other similarly- 
motivated service members if he intends to contribute to bombing a hospital but does not 
know that his specifi c individual action is currently furthering that action. Baker is also equally 
responsible with other knowing or similarly- motivated personnel for the entire unjust war if 
he knows it is unjust and is motivated to bring about its unjust ends. In these cases, the organ-
izational member eff ectively is using the organization like a goal- oriented collective, like an 
instrument for his personal unjust agenda, doing whatever he can to link his eff orts with others 
to bring about unjust ends he favors. 
 In conclusion, our attention is drawn to the same potential components of culpability, like 
power, knowledge, intention, and motive in analysis of irreducibly corporate actions as in analysis 
of individual actions, but the diff erent features of irreducibly corporate and individual actions 
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or contributions to goal- oriented collective actions indicate diff erent horizons for determining 
what the individual is responsible for. A close causal connection to the morally fraught action 
is less important for being deemed responsible for it in goal- oriented collective action than in 
individual action. We are also less likely to fi nd the requisite levels of knowledge and intention-
ality to deem someone responsible for irreducibly corporate actions than for individual actions 
expressed in superfi cially similar physical behaviors. The contributor to an unjust irreducibly 
corporate action is potentially responsible for a much greater harm than if he committed an 
unjustifi ed individual action but is also less likely than an individual actor engaging in identical 
physical behavior to be liable for  any unjustifi ed action. 
 19.6 Conclusion 
 Organizations are irreducibly responsible for their collective actions. Within an organization, 
each actor in the chain of command is individually responsible for his unique interpretation 
of the collective intention and unique contribution to collective action(s). Often, the actions 
of lower echelon organizational members will tend to be more fully defi ned by their roles, 
with higher echelon members freer to add more of their personal expertise and creativity. This 
account of responsibility is geared to the “ideal” circumstances of an organization in which the 
member is non- culpably ignorant of the collective action in question and not motivated to see 
its fruition. The member is morally responsible for the action in the way described in the last 
section if he actually does know about the specifi c collective action he materially advances (be 
it a proximate joint project or the organization’s ultimate collective action) and intends his con-
tribution to further that collective action because he is motivated to see its fruition. 
 A member of a goal- oriented collective is fully morally responsible along with all other 
members of his group for the collective action, regardless of the extent of his causal contribu-
tion or his knowledge of the specifi c action so long as it is consistent with the general purpose 
for which he joined the group. It follows that there is a heavier burden on entrants into goal- 
oriented collectives than into organizations to understand the scope of the group’s actions. 
 Notes 
 1  Bratman  1999 ), Toumela ( 1984 ), and Gilbert ( 1989 ) discuss how group members’ intentions mesh in an 
interdependent manner since one person forms an intention for a component of the collective action 
only because she knows her comrades are forming intentions to perform other components of the col-
lective action. 
 2  Individualists describe collective action in terms of individual contributory actions, so that a tango, for 
example, is understood to consist of the lead dancer doing X and his partner doing Y. At its root, a tango 
can be fully described using sentences describing one dancer at a time. By contrast, collectivists argue 
that collective members’ behavior can only be intelligibly understood in the context of their collective 
affi  liation, so in this case, each dancer would be described as dancing a tango. 
 3  A goal- oriented collective might have a hierarchy though it is established by its like- minded members in 
order to accomplish a particular goal. In country C, tribe members who had come to see a neighboring 
tribe as an existential threat perhaps decided to “do what had to be done” and nominated some among 
them, military veterans, to lead the attacks. 
 4  Jeff  McMahan argues that putatively collective actions can be reduced to individual actions with this 
reasoning, personal communication. 
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